Research

How do de facto states balance the drive for external legitimacy with their need to sustain themselves? To answer this question, I develop an original explanation of de facto state behaviour in two parts. First, I argue that a gradational understanding of the external legitimacy of de facto states more accurately captures the international interactions of these political entities.  Rather than have the same null level of non-recognition, I use an original dataset and a Bayesian latent variable model to demonstrate how 31 de facto states have different degrees of external legitimacy that often change over time. I supplement this measure with an expert conjoint survey experiment (N=133) of diplomats and academics and a convergent validity test. I also investigate the strategic calculations that guide state officials in de facto states for fulfilling their goals. Relying on dozens of elite interviews with government officials in Somaliland, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Abkhazia and Kosovo, I explore the various trade-offs and maneuverings officials in these regions undertake in relation to their varying levels of external legitimacy. My findings indicate that all de facto states face issues of security, poverty, isolation, emigration, and instability, which they attribute to their lack of UN recognition. Although UN membership is a long-term goal for these regions, my research suggests that domestic stability and the enhancement of internal legitimacy are of primary importance. In tandem, I demonstrate how de facto states rely on both formal and informal relations with recognized states to forge meaningful networks of cross-border kin, diasporas and state allies who implicitly and overtly support their continued existence.